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COMMENTS TO STARRS SPEECH
DR. MymisoN:
I have been dealing with alcoholics both in a hospital setting
and in a penal setting, and the only conclusion I can make is
that the middle class alcoholic or the upper middle class alcoholic never goes to jail for alcoholism. In a middle class setting
the sheriff would simply push his friend aside and drive the
car home. My feeling is that there is, indeed, a tremendous
unfairness in the handling of the alcoholic population and that
we are groping, each with our own individual philosophies, to
find a more just way of handling this problem. I think this is
especially true in the narcotics field, where we are faced with the
dilemma of not only the addiction problem but also the fact that
these people are stealing the community blind. The community
is entitled to some protection, perhaps more so than from the
alcoholic.
PRuorssoR

SwAITz:

I would like to just pursue some of the topics discussed by
talking about the consequences of a finding at the trial that
there was unconsciousness and lack of a voluntary act. Take for
example, as perhaps an extreme case, the instance Professor
Starrs gave of the woman who in her sleep picked up an ax and,
in a dreamlike state, thinking that she is protecting her daughter, swings that ax and kills an innocent human being. The provision of the criminal law at the present time is that a finding
of a lack of voluntary conduct results in a straight acquittal.
The individual is free to walk out the courthouse door, in contrast with the provision in the defense of insanity that an
acquittal on grounds of insanity requires an inquiry into the
possibility of commitment to the hospital for the criminally insane, or perhaps even an automatic commitment. Does this
straight acquittal perhaps pose a problem? It is relevant to
what we have been saying at this workshop concerning the
chronic alcoholic because if the chronic alcoholic is not acting
voluntarily, he will also be free to walk out the courthouse door.
We have a question here about what mechanisms of the law we
are dealing with in this broad category of defense.
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PROFESSOR STARRS:

In the case you mentioned, the lady showed some indications
of some basic disorder which needed treatment. I might have
slighted treatment facilities in discussing criminal law theory.
I am concerned where the concentration upon treatment has a
direct impact upon the notion of responsibility. I don't have
to point out that the consequences of conviction are greater than
merely fine or time in jail. The loss of civil rights comes
imediately to mind. The loss of the right to serve in the military, on a jury, to be licensed and so many other items results
from criminal convictions. It is important, therefore, to keep
separate and distinct the questions of criminality and punishability. While I am concerned about what is done with these
people once they're acquitted, I do not believe that this at all
challenges the theory of the acquittal. It merely indicates there
has to be a follow-up somewhere along the line.
What has happened in the Easter case is that throughout the
country there has been a misreading of the case because of the
language used. The courts are seeing in the Easter case an opportunity to continue to convict chronic alcoholics. Mr. Hutt
left it to the court to permit them to remain in a confused state
about the distinction between aetus reus and mens rea.The judge
merely has to say that the statute does not require mens rea.
That's exactly what many have said. It seems to me that this
position does not serve the objectives that Mr. Hutt sets out. In
other words, if he is truly convinced of his objectives, he should
use criminal doctrines that would accomplish that objective.
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